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Abstract 
Relying on the corporate personhood doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly 
expanded the scope of rights granted to corporations and other forms of collective entities. 
While this trend has received widespread attention in legal scholarship and the media, there 
is no empirical research examining how people think about the rights of corporations. We 
investigated this issue in a series of three studies, each exploring a different constitutional 
right (religious liberty, privacy, and freedom of speech). In each study, we examined 
people’s willingness to grant rights in several types of business contexts (i.e., a ‘closely held’ 
family business, a large national corporation, for-profit and non-for-profit companies) and to 
different types of targets (i.e., employees, owners, and the company as a separate entity). We 
also looked at whether perceptions of corporate (versus individual) rights are affected by 
political ideology. Our results demonstrate that people are significantly and consistently less 
willing to grant the same scope of protection to companies versus people, particularly if 
these companies are for-profit large corporations. This tendency persisted among both 
liberals and conservatives. We identified ideological differences in the relations between 
employee and company rights: these were positively related among conservatives and more 
conflicting among liberals. Importantly, we found some evidence that people grant rights to 
companies because they want to protect the rights of individuals. Taken together these 
results indicate that, psychologically speaking, individuals (and not corporations) are the 
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Introduction 
Corporations have enjoyed constitutional rights since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (1886), when the 
Court in a “causal” aside extended equality protections to a for-profit railroad (Horowitz, 
1986). A recent expansion in corporate rights, however, provoked considerable public 
controversy: the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which freed 
corporations’ use of general treasury funds for political advertising, generated a “furor” at 
the prospect of increasing corporate influence on political life (Levitt, 2010). President 
Obama called the Citizens United decision a “major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, 
health insurance companies, and other powerful interests that marshal their power every day 
in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.” (Kang, 2012). The decision 
even generated appeals for a constitutional amendment (Blackstone, 2013). More recently, 
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2013), the Supreme Court recognized the religious liberty 
interest of closely-held for-profit corporations. That decision is also likely to prove divisive 
as further religious liberty challenges are brought by for-profit corporations, including the 
minority (6 per cent) of pharmacists who object to birth control measures such as inter-
uterine devices (Davidson et al., 2010).  
Despite its divisiveness, judicial recognition of corporate rights does not rest on 
robust theoretical or empirical foundations (Garrett, 2014). The Supreme Court has never 
elaborated its holding in Santa Clara County. As early as 1926, John Dewey observed that 
courts tend to recognize corporate personhood for some purposes, but not others, based 
largely on “extraneous dogmas and ideas” drawn “from psychology or philosophy or what 
not” (Dewey 1926, p. 657). Dewey therefore concluded that the judicial recognition of 
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corporate personhood could not be understood without examining the way in which widely 
held assumptions influenced the law. Dewey’s methodological concern has been echoed by 
subsequent generations of legal scholars and social scientists who have called for 
“behavioral realism” in legal theory thorough rigorous attention to how such theory 
corresponds with scientific knowledge about human mind and behavior  (Krieger & Fiske, 
2006; Kang & Banaji, 2006; Mentovich & Jost, 2008). 
This present study pursues the concerns identified by Dewey and others by exploring 
the psychology of corporate rights. Its central aim is to identify the predicate grounds on 
which individuals treat corporations like or unlike natural persons. Our focus is on three 
constitutional rights – religious liberty, free speech, and privacy – that have been a focus of 
public attention. A better understanding of the psychological bases of corporate rights’ 
recognition may help predict whether and when judicial endowment of corporate rights will 
spark protest. Although a richer account of the psychology of corporate rights may not 
directly feed into the law, it may also inform legal reasoning. For example, the majority and 
the dissent in Hobby Lobby differed over how to interpret the word “person” in the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The majority read that word to include closely held for-
profit corporations, but did not rule that the term included larger, publicly traded 
corporations. The dissent, in contrast, read the term “person” to reach only not-for-profit 
corporations. An understanding of when — and why — individuals see corporations as 
rights-holders may inform how the statutory language is properly read, and thus whether the 
majority or the dissent more accurately capture the original usage of the term.   
Systematic empirical exploration of the psychology of corporate rights has received 
little academic attention to date — in contrast to their economic, philosophical and legal 
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dimensions. Only a handful of recent psychological works offer contributions regarding how 
individuals attribute group (as opposed to individual) mind, as well as how such attributions 
impact inferred intentionality and moral responsibility of collective entities in comparison to 
the persons who constitute them (Tyler & Mentovich, 2011; Waytz &Young, 2012). 
Extending these lines of inquiry, we first examine the relationship between corporate and 
individual rights. As public discourse (and Supreme Court ruling) often follow ideological 
lines, we further analyze how political preferences influence the psychological dynamics 
underlie granting rights to corporations. Finally, we examine the potential reasons for which 
people are willing to extend rights to corporations.   
The Legal Rights of Corporations 
Corporate rights vary in practice along two dimensions. First, corporations have 
some rights but not others. For example, corporate claims to equal protection under the law, 
free speech, privacy, and—most recently—religious liberty have all been recognized in 
court. In contrast, corporate claims to rights against self-incrimination, to the privileges and 
immunities of state citizenship, and to individual liberty have not been recognized (Garrett, 
2014). Second, different species of corporations obtain different levels of judicial protection 
(Bhagwati, 2011). In Hobby Lobby, for example, the Court was divided over whether any 
for-profit corporations could bring religious liberty claims in court. In a pre-Citizens United 
campaign finance decision, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., (1986), the 
Supreme Court distinguished for the purposes of campaign finance regulation between for-
profit entities, and a non-profit, non-stock corporation formed solely for the purpose of 
engaging in political speech and advocacy. More recently, the Court has created different 
regimes for the individual members of labor unions and for-profit corporations: The former 
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have a right to opt out of funding political speech they do not support, while the latter do not 
(Sachs, 2012).  
It is important to note that not all consequences of corporate personhood are disputed, 
and not all are sought after. On the one hand, few would argue that corporations should not 
have personhood for the purposes of entering and enforcing contracts. On the other hand, 
while much doubt obtains about corporate rights, there is no analogous skepticism about 
corporate criminal responsibilities—at least in theory (Green, 1991). Corporations have been 
considered persons for the purposes of criminal prosecution since the Middle Ages (Dubber, 
2013), although recent studies suggest that prosecutions are rarely successful (Garrett, 2007; 
Laufer, 2006). Criminal liability is arguably distinct from the sort of personhood necessary 
for the recognition of rights (Isaacs, 2013). But for the purposes of criminal adjudication, 
corporations do benefit from the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights (Henning, 
1996).  
There is no theoretical, normative justification for the observed variation in corporate 
rights—or at least none has yet been offered by the Supreme Court (Garrett, 2014). 
Philosophical justifications have been offered for treating corporations as “members of the 
moral community of equal standing” (French, 1979, p. 207). This conclusion is sharply 
contested by Velasquez (1983), who argues that it is merely a confused way of attributing 
responsibility to individual participants in the corporation. Economic theory, moreover, does 
not fill the gap (Lee, 2009). Jensen and Meckling’s (1975) canonical article, for example, 
parsimoniously defines a corporation as a “nexus of contracts” (for applications to law, see 
Easterbrook & Fischel, 1989; Klausner, 1995); in another classic treatment, Hart and Moore 
(1988) focus on the firm as a solution to problems arising from contractual incompleteness. 
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In a similar foundational analysis, Coase argued that the size of a firm would be a function 
of the relative costs of internalizing a transaction within its boundaries versus entering the 
same transaction in the marketplace: Firms would grow, that is, to internalize transactions 
when it was efficient to do so, and otherwise rely on the market (Coase 1937). These 
contractual-based analytic frameworks can be effectively applied to predict the scale of 
enterprises, and, for example to explain why some firms are small and family owned, while 
others are expansive and publicly traded (Villalonga & Amit, 2010; Williamson, 2003). 
They provide little guidance, however, as to when (or why) more fundamental rights of 
corporations should be recognized.  
Recent changes to the scope of corporate constitutional rights thus cannot be 
explained by any theoretical framework of rights derived from constitutional law, economic 
theory, or philosophical accounts. These changes have been most pronounced in the context 
of three kinds of corporate rights: speech, religious freedom, and privacy1. First, with respect 
to free speech rights, corporate candidate contributions, as well as independent political 
expenditures, have been outlawed since the Tillman Act of 1907 (2 U.S.C. § 441b). The 
prohibition has been justified both as an effort to prevent firms’ managers from supporting 
policies using shareholders’ resources, as well as to prevent large advantage that 
corporations have in the political competition over regular citizens (Sitkoff, 2002). 
Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court issued a series of holdings that granted corporations 
First Amendment rights and undermined the Tillman Act (see FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life, 2007; Citizens United v. FEC, 2010; McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 
2014). The practical effect of these decisions is to endow corporations with First 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The structure of claim, however, is slightly different than the claims of speech and religious rights: In 
respect to privacy, corporations have not asserted their own interests, but rather resisted disclosures on the 
ground that individual third parties’ interests will be compromised. 
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Amendment rights to unlimited campaign expenditures and to permit only weak legal 
limitations to candidate contributions.  
Second, in 2014, the Court recognized a corporate right to religious freedom in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. The Court held that closely held corporations could resist 
compliance with federal healthcare coverage mandates on the basis of sincerely held 
religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby concerned the question of whether corporations would have 
to pay for certain forms of medical coverage. A subsequent Supreme Court order seemingly 
extended the right of noncompliance on religious grounds by allowing organizations to 
refuse even to sign a form authorizing a third party to provide contraceptive coverage for 
women employees (Wheaton College v. Burwell, 2014). The range of entities that now 
possess constitutional rights is also unclear. Justice Samual Alito’s logic in the Hobby Lobby 
majority opinion seems to extend to larger, publicly traded corporations, but the Court 
expressly refrained from holding that such entities had religious liberty rights. By contrast, a 
dissent in the case would have limited such rights to non-profit entities only.   
The right recognized in Hobby Lobby is nevertheless limited in two respects. First, 
the decision was an interpretation of a federal statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993, not the Constitution. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby 
extensively cited cases interpreting the Constitution to reach its holding. Second, the 
majority limited its ruling to closely held corporations, rather than larger, publicly traded 
ones. Nevertheless, both minority and majority opinions relied on the doctrine of legal 
personhood and deemed collective entities as appropriate recipients of religious rights. They 
only differ in the sort of organizations that deserve them. Futhermore, the Hobby Lobby 
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decision is likely to precipitate further claims by corporations for exceptions from generally 
applicable laws based on religious belief. 
A third domain in which corporations have claimed increasing rights concerns 
privacy from electronic surveillance by the government. The state can rely on 
telecommunications’ aggregations of electronic communications and metadata generated by 
communication and internet use to intrude on its citizens and foreign individuals (Solove, 
2002). Individual privacy, therefore, is determined by corporate policy in regard to 
government requests for data. Corporations sometimes act to protect individual privacy. In 
June 2013, for example, both Microsoft and Google filed lawsuits challenging aspects of the 
U.S. government’s requests for communications metadata (Carroll, 2013). The secure e-mail 
service Lavabit did not assert a privacy-derived right against government requests for data. 
Instead, it closed rather than comply with those requests (Perlroth & Shane, 2013). Unlike 
religious or speech rights, the majority of privacy claims by corporations have been raised to 
defend the rights of employees. Thus, privacy, it seems to us, has a slightly different valence 
to speech and religious freedom. Whereas corporate speech and corporate religious freedom 
may have a conservative cast as policy goals, the privacy interests pursued by Microsoft, 
Google, and Lavabit have either a liberal or a libertarian cast.   
Empirical Research on the Social Psychology of Corporate Rights 
There is little research into the conditions under which individuals tend to recognize 
the rights of corporations. Some studies suggest that individuals evaluate corporates 
according to normative criteria, and alter their behavior based on these assessments. Prior 
work on procedural justice suggests that perceptions of corporate entities, and their 
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compliance with norms of procedural justice and fairness, influences employee compliance 
with internal rules (Tyler & Blader, 2005).  
While not exploring this issue directly, works about the attribution of mind to 
collective entities can have implications to the issue of corporate rights. In a series of studies, 
Waytz and Young (2012) explored the relations between attributions of mind to groups and 
to their individual members, as well as the implications of these relations to perceptions of 
moral responsibility. In one study, participants were presented with several groups ranging 
from car owners, to the U.S. Congress, to McDonald’s Corp. Participants were asked how 
much mind they attribute to these groups versus their individual group members. The study 
— which is not focused on corporate entities — identifies a negative correlation between 
attributions of group mind and attributions of individual mind. Importantly, Waytz and 
Young further show that greater attributions of mind lead to greater attributions of 
responsibility because “perceivers are capable of attributing only a finite amount of mind” 
(p.83). Similarly, Morewedge et al. (2013) find that attribution of mind to individual 
members of a group is inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual 
belonged. Menon et al. (1999), however, find cultural differences in the strength of group 
agency attributions, with East Asian respondents being more willing than North American 
respondents to discern group agency.  
It therefore seems that the lack of ability to attribute mental life to groups 
(particularly to groups that are big in size and lack cohesion) renders them less appropriate 
to the attribution of moral agency, responsibility, and culpability (see also Tyler & 
Mentovich, 2011; Mentovich & Cerf, 2014). We argue that this deficiency should also 
impact people’s willingness to grant rights to collective entities. Though, unlike moral 
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agency, the reception of rights is rooted in moral patency and the desire to defend targets 
from potential suffering or wrongdoing (see Gray & Wenger, 2009), both moral agency and 
patiency seem to be anchored in the existence of mental life (see Gray, Young & Waytz, 
2012 for a similar analysis). For the same reasons it is difficult for people to attribute mental 
life to collectives—and thus view them capable of forming intent, and being morally 
responsible—it would be difficult to see collectives as suffer harm, require protection, and 
deserve rights at the same degree that natural people do.    
The above conclusion may explain public reaction to the rulings of Citizens’ United 
and Hobby Lobby but it is not directly supported by empirical research. With the exception 
of public opinion surveys, we have been unable to identify any prior empirical work that 
analyzes the predicates for public recognition of corporate rights. In effect, almost ninety 
years after Dewey’s claims, we are still not much better informed as to why and when 
corporate rights will be generally endorsed. An understanding of public judgments about 
corporate rights is relevant to the stability of decisions such as Citizens’ United and Hobby 
Lobby, as much as it is relevant to the psychology of rights more generally. It seems that 
both legal discussion and empirical research on the issue of corporate (versus individual) 
rights are deeply undertheorized and underexplored. The current research seeks to provide 
the first step in the exploration of this issue. 
Overview of the Present Research 
In a series of three studies, we explored whether, and to what extent, people deem 
corporate entities, as opposed to individuals, as deserving of fundamental rights. We 
analyzed three slightly different rights: religious liberty in study one, privacy in study two, 
and freedom of speech in study three. In each study the organizational context was 
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manipulated such that participants were presented with five different business settings. 
These included three traditional for-profit businesses (a family owned small company, a 
local publicly traded chain, and a national mega corporation) as well as two other 
organizations that matched to the context of the specific right at stake (e.g., a church in the 
religious freedom context and a newspaper in the context of freedom of speech). 
Participants in each study were asked to rate the extent to which they believed three 
target recipients within each of the different organizations presented to them deserved to 
receive the given right. These targets included the company’s owners (or a close analog 
when ownership did not exist), the company’s employees, and the company itself as a 
separate legal entity. It is important to note that we did not employ a tradeoff between 
individual and entity rights in the research design. That is, the rights of one target (e.g., the 
employees) did not come at the expense of another target (i.e., the company itself). Instead, 
participants could grant as much of a given right to a target as they saw fit. This design 
ensures that we assess how people naturally think about company and individual rights other 
than how they prioritize them.  
Study 1 – Religious Liberty 
Participants 
One hundred and eleven participants were recruited online using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (‘MTurk’) platform (Seattle, WA). To be eligible to participate in the 
study Mturk participants had to conduct at least 50 studies prior to this one, have an 
approval rate equal or higher than 95%, and to have a U.S. IP address. Fifteen participants 
failed the attention check questions (described below) and were therefore excluded from 
further analyses. Our final sample, comprised of 96 individuals, was demographically 
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diverse: 50% were females, 84% whites, Mean age = 36.99 (SD = 13.3), 28.1% of 
participants defined themselves as somewhat religious and 25.3% describe themselves as 
extremely religious, 12.5% participants had high school education, 39.6% had post high 
school (but no college) degree, and 41.5% had a college degree. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were recruited into a study entitled “Your opinions about religious 
liberty in the U.S.” Participants were first asked several demographic questions; they then 
were allowed to proceed to the experimental scenarios, which included a description of five 
different organizational contexts. These five prompts were presented in a random order. 
Political orientation: as part of the demographic section participants indicated how 
liberal conservative they see themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (‘extremely liberal’) to 7 
(‘extremely conservative’), M = 3.65; SD = 1.79. 
Attention Check: As part of the demographic section we applied two attention check 
test, typically used with online participants (see, e.g., Waytz and Young, 2012). In the first 
test participants were told: “some participants in surveys fail to pay attention to the 
questions asked and answer automatically. This can affect the results and skew the data. In 
order to prevent this situation we created a control question. In this question we ask you not 
to answer anything and simply continue to the next page. Non-attentive participants will end 
up selecting hobbies from the below list despite the above instructions.” This question was 
followed with a question asking: “Which activities do you engage in regularly (check all that 
apply)?” Participants who provided any answer to this question were excluded due to failing 
the attention check. 
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A second attention check told participants that “For sake of validation, please type 
the same number you use for this question as your answer for the next one (ignoring the 
question about 'number of times the letter 'a' appears in the sentence).” Participants who 
showed discrepancies in their answers were also excluded from further analyses. 
Experimental scenarios: Participants were presented with different types business 
settings and were asked to report the extent to which several targets within each setting 
deserve religious liberty rights. These business settings included the following descriptions: 
Family owned store: “Consider a corner grocery store located in the small town of 
Davis, Nebraska. The store is owned by Ben and Eva Gordon. Apart from the two owners, 
the store has 3 full-time employees. The store is a legally separate entity incorporated under 
state law.” 
Local Chain: “Consider a local chain of several grocery stores that are located 
within twenty miles of each other, within the state of Nevada. The chain employs about 700 
people, and has a management team that includes Chief Executive Officer, Chief Finance 
Officer, as well as a team of 50 local branch managers. The stores are part of a single 
company. The chain is a legally separate entity incorporated under state law. The equity in 
that company is not publicly traded, but is held by a small group of individual owners.” 
National Chain: “Consider a national chain of 1500 grocery stores that has branches 
across the Atlantic seaboard, the Midwest, South and Pacific coasts. The chain has about 
100 employees in each branch (150,000 employees altogether across the country). The chain 
is managed by a team that includes a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Finance Officer, and 
150 local branch managers. The chain is a legally separate entity incorporated under state 
law. The equity in the company is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange.” 
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Secular non-profit: “Consider a not-for-profit organization that operates a food 
bank that serves both urban and rural communities across New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Arkansas. The food bank has 500 volunteers and is managed by a team of four 
presidents - each overseeing a different state.” 
Religious non-profit (church): “Consider a local church that also operates social 
services and provides aid to the needy in the community. The church has branches across 
one 3 adjacent towns in South Dakota. The church has about 500 employees, including 
clergy and lay employees. It is managed by a group of four spiritual leaders, rotating in their 
positions every two years.” 
Targets: After they had read each of these prompts, participants were asked to “rate 
to which extent the following [targets] have a right for religious liberty,” on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The targets always included the company’s owners (in 
the case of the food bank we used the presidents as a closest substitute for owners, and in the 
case of the church we used the pastors); the company’s employees (in the case of the food 
bank we used volunteers); and the company itself as a separate legal entity.  
Results and Discussion 
We conducted a 5 (business setting) x 3 (target identity) Repeated Measures 
ANOVA on the participants’ ratings of targets’ deservingness of religious liberty rights. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Figure 1. 
-----  Figure 1 approximately here ------ 
As Figure 1 shows, our analysis yielded a strong main effect of target identity, 
F(2,182) = 99.13, p <.001, η² = .53. People consistently and strongly preferred granting 
people – whether they were asked about owners (M = 6.59, SE = .1) or about employees (M 
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= 6.6, SE = .09) – religious liberty rights. In contrast, their preference for corporate rights 
was much weaker (M = 4.29, SE = .21).  
In addition, the results revealed a significant target by business setting interaction 
F(8,728) = 21.4, p < .0001, ηp² = .19. While respondents’ desire to maintain religious liberty 
rights of employees or owners remained constant across settings, they were significantly 
more willing to give religious liberty rights to non-profit companies (and in particular the 
church, rather than the non-profit) compared with for-profit companies, F(4,364) = 22.96, p 
< .001, ηp² = .19. 
Political ideology: As the issue of company or corporate rights is often seen as 
affected by the ideological divide, we explored the role of political ideology in predicting 
these results. To this purpose we created two political ideology groups from our continuous 
political affiliation variable: a liberals group (comprised of participants who scores between 
1 and 3 in the political ideology scale, N = 44) and a conservative group (comprised of 
participants who score between 4 and 7 in the political ideology scale, N = 52). We then 
conducted a 2 (political ideology) X 5 (business settings) X 3 (target identity) mixed design 
ANOVA. Results indicated that there was a significant yet small interaction effect of 
political orientation by business setting and target identity, F(8,720) = 2.05, p = .03, ηp² 
= .02. Results of this analysis are presented in Figures 2a and 2b. 
-----  Figures 2a and 2b approximately here ------ 
As can be seen in Figures 2a and 2b, liberals and conservative differed in respect to 
how much religious liberty rights they granted to employees and owners (where liberals 
scored slightly higher than their conservative counterparts), and also in respect to how much 
religious rights they assign to for-profit companies (where conservatives scored slightly 
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higher than their liberal counterparts). However, for both groups there was a strong and 
consistent preference to grant religious liberty rights to individuals (employees or owners) 
rather than companies themselves.  
The relations between company and employee rights: Following Waytz and Young 
(2012), we examined the relations between individual and company rights. Waytz and 
Young’s findings indicated the existence of negative relations between groups and group 
members in the domain of moral responsibility. We sought to examine whether the same 
relations exist in the case of moral privileges of civic rights. As participants’ scores showed 
little variation in the for-profit businesses (see Figure 1), our analysis was focused on the 
family owned business. We fitted a linear regression model in which participants’ scores of 
employees religious rights (centered) were regressed onto their scores of the company’s 
religious rights. This analysis identified no relations between employees and company rights, 
B =  -.12, β = -.052, p = n/s. We did, however, find an interaction between political ideology 
(centered) and the relations between employees and company rights, B =  .31, SE = .157, β 
= .21, p = .05. The results of this analysis are plotted in Figure 3.  
---- put Figure 3 about here----- 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the relation between employee and company rights 
varied as a function of ideological leaning. For liberals, the two stand in contrast. That is, the 
more they supported religious rights of employees the less they supported religious rights of 
companies. For conservatives, however, company and employee rights were positively 
related and the more they endorsed religious liberty rights of employees the more they 
endorsed these rights in the context of the company itself. It is important to recall here that 
the research design did not posit a trade-off between corporate and individual rights. The 
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interactions observed in Figure 3, therefore, reflect divergent and convergent views about 
individual and corporate rights, not different ways of resolving a tension set up in the 
research instrument.  
In net, these results suggest that people seem to consider individuals as the more 
appropriate receivers of religious rights compared with organizations (particularly for-profit 
businesses). The tendency to prefer granting rights to individuals rather than to collective or 
business entities was extremely robust. It was not eliminated when participants considered a 
non-profit organization, and even when the religious liberty of church was at stake. In 
addition, the precise structure of for-profit business had no influence on participants, who 
viewed all forms of for-profit businesses as the least deserving of religious liberty rights. 
Non-profit businesses and particularly the church were deemed as more deserving of 
religious liberty, but never to the extent of individuals. 
Moreover, political ideology had very little influence on the above result. 
Conservative respondents showed only slightly greater willingness to grant for-profit 
corporations more religious liberty rights. The most significant difference between these 
ideological groups is not in the absolute level of conservatives and liberals’ support for 
religious liberty for companies, but rather how they seem to think about company and 
individuals rights. For conservatives, these two species of rights tend to be related; for 
liberals, either one or the other is present. 
Study 2 - Privacy 
Study 2 extended the framework of inquiry applied to religious liberty in Study 1 to 
privacy. At least in early 2014, when these studies were conducted, religious liberty may 
have received more media attention. It also may be perceived as unique because of the 
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distinctive role of religion in many individual lives (but few corporate settings). Hence, the 
design of Study 2 was very similar in design to Study 1 but examined a different basic right 
of privacy. Like in Study 1, participant were presented with several hypotheticals 
concerning a diverse array of corporate entities, and then asked to evaluate the extent to 
which given targets deserve privacy rights. 
Participants  
One hundred and fifty participants were recruited online using Mturk platform, 
employing the same eligibility criteria as in Study 1. Twenty-eight participants failed the 
attention-check filters (identical to those used in study 1), and were thus excluded from 
further analyses. The final sample was demographically diverse: (65 males, 56 females; Age 
range 18-73, Mage = 35.98, SD = 13.79; 50.8% reported having at least a Bachelor’s degree). 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials used were similar to those of study 1. Participants were 
presented five corporate entities (in a random order), and then asked to rate the extent to 
which these companies’ owners, employees, and the entity itself deserved privacy rights. 
Experimental scenarios: the three for-profit businesses were identical to those used 
in study 1 and included a family owned store, a local chain, and a national mega chain. We 
omitted the non-profit and the church hypotheticals used in Study 1, which were keyed to 
the religious context, and included two additional businesses that were described as follows: 
Newspaper: Consider a daily newspaper published in Washington DC. The 
newspaper has about 300 employees, including journalists and editorial staff and is 
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published in DC daily since 1881. The newspaper is owned by the Silver family that has 
several other newspapers and media outlets.2 
Mental Health Center:  Consider a mental health center that operates in several 
locations across California. The center has about 500 employees, including psychiatrists, 
psychologists and other staff members, and is managed by a president who oversees all the 
locations. 
Targets: In each of the scenarios participants were asked to ‘rate to which extent the 
following [targets] have privacy rights’, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). The targets always included the company’s owners (in the case of mental health 
center we asked about the presidents of the center); the company’s employees, and the 
company itself as a separate legal entity.  
Results and Discussion 
We conducted a 3 x 5 repeated measure ANOVA similar to the one employed in 
study 1. The results of this study are presented in Figure 4. This analysis yielded a robust 
effect of the target identity, F(2,240) = 101.67, p <.001, η² = .46, replicating Study 1 in 
respect to a different right. That is, participants were much less inclined to grant privacy 
rights to businesses as a separate legal entity, compared with their owners and employees.  
-----  Figure 4 approximately here ------ 
In addition, differences once more emerged between different kinds of corporate 
entities, as indicated by a significant target identity by business context interaction, F(8, 960) 
= 5.95, p <.001, η²p = .05. Participants were least likely to grant to privacy rights to the large 
national corporation, and were most likely to grant these rights to the family-owned store 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We included a newspaper for two reasons. First, news reporting can implicate the privacy interests of 
sources as well as targets of journalism. Second, newspapers are also an obvious object of analysis for free 
speech rights, the subject of Study 3. Hence, their inclusion here facilitates cross-study comparisons.  
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and the mental-health center. It bears emphasis, however, that these differences were 
substantially smaller than the difference between companies and individuals (owners and 
employees). Interestingly, while in the context of religious liberty participants showed no 
difference in their desire to grant religious rights to employees versus owners, in the context 
of privacy, they were more willing to grant rights to employees compared with owners 
F(1,120) = 20.38, p < .001, η² = .14.   
Political ideology: As in Study 1, we divided participants into two groups: Liberals 
(who scored between 1 and 3 on the political ideology scale, n=65), and conservatives (who 
scored between 4 and 6 on the political ideology scale n=57). We then conducted a 2 
(political ideology) x 5 (business settings) x 3 (target identity) mixed design ANOVA. 
Results indicated only ideology by target identity interaction, F(2,238) = 3.106, p = .046, η²p 
= .025. This showed that conservatives were slightly, albeit consistently, more likely to grant 
privacy rights to all companies at stake (M = 4.76, SE = .24) compared with liberals (M = 
4.2, SE = .23). However both groups way equally (and more) likely to grant privacy rights to 
employees  (Mlib = 6.35, SE = .11; Mcon = 6.27, SE = .12), and owners (Mlib = 5.96, SE = .15; 
Mcon = 5.97, SE = .16). 
The relations between company and employee rights: We conducted the same 
regression analysis performed in study 1. This analysis yielded the same political ideology 
by employee rights interactions (B = .22, SE = .12, β = .17, p = .06). Again, the relations 
between employees and company privacy rights were different among liberals and 
conservatives. For liberals, corporate and employee rights were negatively related. For 
conservatives, they were positively related.  
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In summary, study 2 generated results that echoed the main findings of Study 1 in a 
different context of a right to privacy. Results suggest that the main factor influencing 
granting privacy rights is whether the recipients of these protections are real people or 
artificial legal entities like businesses or corporations. While there is variation in people’s 
willingness to grant companies privacy rights as a function of the business structure (where 
larger corporations are seen even less deserving for such rights) and goals (where 
organizations like mental health center and newspaper are seen as slightly more deserving of 
such rights), as well as political orientation (where conservatives are more inclined to give 
privacy rights to businesses), the main distinction people seem to make is between 
individuals and businesses. In addition, we also replicated the results of study 1 with regard 
to how ideology impacts the relations between employee and company rights.  Whereas 
conservatives seem to not see any contradiction between these two elements liberals hold a 
more contrasting views according to which company rights undermine the rights of 
employees. 
Study 3 – Freedom of Speech 
The purpose of study 3 is twofold. First, we examine whether the results of studies 1 
and 2 can be replicated in a related but distinct context of freedom of speech. The idea that 
companies deserve free speech as citizens recently came into prominence after the Supreme 
Court ruling in the case of Citizens’ United v. FEC (2010). The Supreme Court in that case 
held that independent corporate expenditures received First Amendment protection in that 
case. The vigorous negative response to that opinion raises a question of how aligned 
judicial and public preferences concerning corporate rights in the speech context are. Second, 
in this study, we extend the inquiry of Studies 1 and 2 by exploring the reasons underlying 
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people judgments of companies’ deservingness of rights. More specifically, we analyze two 
hypotheses: first, that individuals recognize corporate rights because they want to protect 
corporations; and second that they recognize such rights because they believe that such 
recognition will conduce to the protection of individual rights. The first hypothesis, that is, 
implies that corporate rights are an intrinsic good, whereas the second one suggests they are 
an instrumental good.    
Participants 
One hundred participants were recruited online form Mturk platform, using the same 
eligibility criteria as in study 1 and 2 and were paid $.5 for participation. Twelve participants 
failed the attention-check filters (identical to those used in study 1 and 2), and were thus 
excluded further analyses. The final sample was demographically diverse: 63.6% males, age 
range from 19-72 (M = 36.2, SD = 14; mean political ideology = 3.52, SD = 1.7). 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials used were similar to those of study 1 and 2, but were 
adapted to the context of free speech. The descriptions of the three for-profit businesses 
were identical to those used in study 2. We also included an identical description of a 
newspaper as a goal-unique business that was included in study 2.  In addition, participants 
were presented with another non-profit organization using the following description: 
Non-profit organization: Consider a not-for-profit organization called ‘Democracy 
Watch’ that works to promote democracy and transparency in U.S government and state 
institutions. The NGO has 500 volunteers and is managed by a team of four presidents - 
each overseeing a different state. 
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Targets: In each of the scenarios participants were asked to ‘rate to which extent the 
following [targets] have privacy rights’, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). The targets always included the company’s owners (in the non-profit we used the 
presidents), the company’s employees (in the case of the non-profit we used volunteers), and 
the company itself as a separate legal entity. 
Mediators: to assess the reasons underlying participants’ desire (or refusal) to grant 
rights to corporations, we assessed two potential explanations.  After participants completed 
the rating of targets’ deservingness of free speech rights in each of the five scenario we 
asked them to think again about three of the given corporate entities previously presented to 
them: the national chain, the newspaper, and the non-profit democracy watch. We also 
provided a brief summary of the information previously given about these organizations. 
Next, in each of these organizations participants were asked how much they agree/ disagree 
that the given organization (the relevant name was provided) as a separate entity should be 
given free speech rights to ‘to protect the free speech of American citizens’ and ‘to to 
protect the free speech of American businesses’. Reponses were given on a scale ranging 
from 1 (=strongly disagree) to 7 (=strongly agree). 
Results and Discussion 
Study 3 generated results that track in large measure those of studies 1 and 2. To 
begin with, the result of a 3 x 5 repeated measure ANOVA are presented in figure 5. This 
analysis revealed a main effect of target identity, F(2,170) = 13.21, p <.001, η² = .14, 
suggesting that participants were less likely to grant free speech rights to companies versus 
their owners of employees. Again, there was a significant target identity by business context 
interaction, F(8, 680) = 1.95, p = .05, η²p = .025. Participants, that is, were more likely to 
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grant free speech rights to the newspaper and the non-profit organization, compared with the 
three for-profit businesses. Nevertheless, as in studies 1 and 2, in all the hypotheticals, 
participants always preferred the free speech rights of individuals (employees and owners) 
compared with the free speech rights of organizations. Interestingly, in the free speech 
context participants showed significant preference for the free speech rights of owners, 
rather than employees, F(1,85) = 5.11, p = .02, η² = .06.  
--------------   put Figure 5 about here   --------------- 
Political ideology: As in study 1 and 2 we created two political ideology groups: 
Liberals (who scored 1-3 on the political ideology scale, n= 45), and conservatives (two 
scored 4-6 on the political ideology scale n = 43). We then conducted a 2 (political ideology) 
x 5 (business settings) x 3 (target identity) mixed design ANOVA. As in Study 2, results 
indicated only an ideology by target identity interaction, F(2,168) = 3.106, p = .007, η²p 
= .057. Conservatives were significantly more likely to grant privacy rights to all companies 
at stake (M = 6.01, SE = .23) compared with liberals (M = 5.38, SE = .23). In addition, 
conservatives were less likely to give free speech rights to both owners and employees (Mown 
= 6.35, SE = .13; Memp = 6.14, SE = .17) compared with their liberal counterparts (Mown = 
6.51, SE = .13; Memp = 6.29, SE = .17).  
The relations between company and employee rights: We conducted the same 
regression analysis performed in studies 1 and 2. That is, we regressed participants’ political 
ideology (centered), participants’ scores of the grocery store employees’ deservingness of 
free speech rights (centered), and their interaction term, on ratings of the grocery store 
deservingness of free speech rights as a separate entity.  This analysis showed yet again a 
significant political ideology by employee rights interaction, B = .295, SE = .12, β = .26, p 
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= .014. The interaction revealed that for conservatives the relations between employees and 
company free speech rights were positively related and for liberals they showed a slight 
negative skew (see graph 2 in supplement materials).  
What explains people’s desire to grant free speech rights to companies? To 
address this question we conducted 3 regression analyses in which participants’ ratings of 
whether free speech rights for a given company (i.e., the national chain, the mental health 
center, and the newspaper) are needed to defend the rights of citizens and business were 
entered as predictor of their willingness to grant rights to the relevant collective entity. 
The results of these analyses are summarized on table 1. As can be seen in table 1, while 
there is some support that at least in the context of a newspaper participants’ willingness 
to grant free speech rights was related to their desire to protect businesses, participants’ 
desire to protect citizens’ was a more consistent and robust predictor.  
----- put table 1 about here------ 
Discussion 
The Supreme Court’s recent forays into corporate rights in Citizens’ United v. FEC 
(2010) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), inter alia, have provoked considerable public 
protest, and in one instance calls for a constitutional amendment (Blackstone, 2013). With 
both Citizens’ United and Hobby Lobby, however, there was some reason to doubt the 
practical importance of the ruling. As Kang (2012) has observed, much of the practical 
effect of Citizens’ United had been anticipated and realized in the Court’s earlier opinion in 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2009); and Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby 
was at pains to stress that compliance with the ruling did not require any diminution of 
employees’ access to mandated healthcare coverage.  Nevertheless, despite some evidence 
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that the opinions would have small immediate practical importance, both provoked 
substantial negative public responses. To be sure, part of the magnitude of these reactions is 
also explained by party cues and political partisanship (see, Nicholson & Hansford, 2014). 
But it is not clear that such cueing effects can explain the public’s receptivity to adverse 
partisan polemics concerning these decisions.   
The results of the present study, by contrast, identify with greater precision a gap 
between the corporate rights as recognized by the Court in those cases as a matter of 
constitutional or statutory law and the corporate rights that both liberal and conservative 
members of the public recognize. In each of our three studies, we identified a significant, 
and substantial, difference between the perceived importance of an individual right and the 
perceived importance of a corresponding corporate right. In every study, respondents 
expressed substantially more regard for individual over corporate rights. This result, 
moreover, held, even in respect to corporate entities that might be thought ex ante to have a 
peculiarly strong claim to a given right—such as churches in regard to religious liberty or 
newspapers in regard to free speech.  Such entities, in each of the three studies, were thought 
by respondents to have better claims to rights than other corporate entities. But in no case 
did support for any kind of corporate right equal in strength support for any kind of 
individual right.    
This strong and consistent result suggests one reason for the magnitude of the public 
outcry after Citizens’ United and Hobby Lobby. Indeed, our results may understate the gap 
between elite judicial and popular preferences. Our research design sought respondents’ 
judgments of rights—without specifying whether these rights were constitutional, statutory, 
or even legal in nature. We chose this design in order to avoid the introduction of a level of 
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precision greater than that plausibly to be expected from non-lawyer members of the public. 
But the results might be interpreted as evidence of public adversity to recognition of any 
speech, religious liberty, or privacy rights, legal or moral, in most corporate entities.  
Intriguingly, our study suggests that although liberals and conservatives diverge in 
certain respects to the recognition of corporate rights to religious freedom, speech, and 
privacy, there is no clear liberal-conservative gap regarding the bottom-line judgment as to 
whether corporate entities of whatever sort should secure such rights. To the contrary, both 
liberals and conservatives have a similar preference for individual over corporate rights. 
Again, this result bears on understandings of the Supreme Court’s interventions in this field. 
Several studies demonstrate that the Supreme Court is in some way, shape, or form, seen as 
a partisan actor (for a summary of the research, see Bartels & Johnson, 2013; Nicholson & 
Hansford, 2014). Nevertheless, the Court’s recent promotion of corporate rights is out of 
step with both liberal and conservative samples of the public. To the extent that the Court is 
responsive to public judgments of corporate rights, therefore, it is possible that it is being 
responsive to a narrower, perhaps elite, perspective (cf. Dahl, 1957). 
Nevertheless, liberal and conservative respondents did differ in one regard: Among 
conservatives, the belief that an individual right matters is positively correlated to the belief 
that corporate rights matter. Among liberals, in contrast, the belief that an individual right 
matters is negative correlated with the belief that a corporate right matters.  It is easier to 
understand the result for conservative respondents here, where results appear to be 
motivated by beliefs over importance of a given right. With respect to liberals, it might be 
hypothesized that respondents presumed a conflict between individual and corporate rights. 
Only when an individual right was not recognized was the path open to recognition of a 
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corporate right. Further research, however, is necessary to understand the relationship of 
political preferences to corporate rights.  
Furthermore, our results shed some light on the psychological mechanisms 
underlying people’s desire to give rights to organizations. Unlike the logic offered by many 
American businesses that petition to the Court for an intrinsic recognition of their 
constitutional rights as businesses, it seems that the public is less driven by the desire to 
protect the rights of businesses per-se, but rather views them as an instrument to protect the 
rights of individuals. 
The current study has further implications for an understanding of the Supreme 
Court. Our results suggest that the public holds a consistent gap between corporate an 
individual rights – a gap that is consistently diminished in the ruling of the Supreme Court. 
Prior work, however, suggests that an intervention by the Court can change public opinion 
in respect to an issue (see, e.g., Hoekstra, 1995). There is also a debate in the literature as to 
whether public support for the Court is a function of perceived its compliance with 
procedural and legalistic norms (Gibson et al., 1998; Zink et al., 2009), or its conformity 
with observers’ policy preferences (Braman & Fontana, 2013).  Further research needs to 
elaborate whether the Court’s decisions  (in cases like Hobby Lobby and others) change 
public views about corporate rights to religious or public damage public support in the 
Supreme Court (or both). 
No less important, the studies presented here also provide a systematic exploration 
of the psychology of collective, and specifically corporate, rights. Expanding on previous 
work demonstrating that people encounter difficulties in attributing mind to collectives, and 
that these difficulties are translated into diminished perception of moral agency, our results 
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show that the same difficulties also impact moral patiency. In other words, it is difficult to 
see non-human artificial collectives as deserving to the same scope of moral protection as 
real people do. 
Conclusion 
This study has examined public preferences over three kinds of corporate rights. Its 
central result is the strong priority of individual over corporate rights—regardless of the 
political preferences of the respondent or the nature of the corporate entities. As well as 
pointing to one explanation for recent antipathy to Supreme Court decisions on corporate 
rights, this result suggests a deep-seated individualism when it comes to recognizing rights 
that are central to American constitutional law.   
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Figure 1: Religious Rights of Owners vs. Employees vs. Company 
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Figures 2a & 2b: Religious Rights of Owners vs. Employees vs. Company by Political 
Ideology. Y-axis represents perceived deservingness of religious liberty rights on a scale of 
1 to 7. 
 
Figure 2a: Liberals 
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Figure 3: Support for company rights as function of support for employee rights and 
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Study 3 results. Y-axis represents perceived deservingness of free speech  rights on a scale 
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Table 1 
The connection between desire to protect American Citizens and American businesses 
and granting free speech rights of companies (study 3) 
                
Mega Corporation 
     B   SE  β  Sig.   
Protect Citizens  .404  .2  .452  = .05 
Protect Businesses  .311  .23  .306  = n/s 
               
Mental Health Center 
     B   SE  β  Sig.   
Protect Citizens  .603  .14  .53  <.001 
Protect Businesses  .176  .11  .199  = n/s  
               
Newspaper 
     B   SE  β  Sig.   
Protect Citizens  .579  .15  .404  <.001 
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Figure 1: Support for company’s privacy rights as function of support for employee rights 
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Figure 2: Support for company’s free speech rights as function of support for employee 
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